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Introduction 
Current international organizations focus more on measuring corruption rather than 
ethics, integrity or transparency in government. Even Transparency International (TI) does not 
actually measure “transparency” but corruption itself. More critical, those measurements may not 
be considering government efforts to prevent public corruption at the national and local level. 
For instance, according to TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), during the last decade the 
phenomenon of corruption in Latin America and the Caribbean countries has remained low-
moderate, reaching ratings between 4 and 5 within the CPI rating scale, which includes values 
between 1 (more corruption) and 10 (less corruption). However, CPI scores may be ignoring 
specific data from the situation at the local government level. Moreover, CPI scores may have 
been seriously ignoring socio-political factors that affect corruption perceptions in society, as in 
the case of Colombia, or extreme poverty, such as in the case of Honduras. In order to escape a 
trap in which transparency efforts enhance the image of more affluent democracies while only 
appearing to confirm negative perceptions of societies in a developing stage, the author proposes 
the creation or improvement of “active transparency” practices at the local government level. 
This will transform citizens into key actors instead of just receptors of laws and anticorruption 
programs designed by government. Hence, this paper first discusses the problem with corruption 
and transparency measurement in the Latin  
American and the Caribbean region, second it briefly addresses two case studies in 
Colombia and Honduras, and third, based on these case studies, it suggests some possible 
solutions to prevent public corruption.  
I. The Problem with Corruption and Transparency Measurement in the Latin American 
and the Caribbean Region  
 In recent years several states in the Latin American and Caribbean region have launched 
major, often innovative, transparency efforts.  All too often, however, important initiatives and 
accomplishments are not reciprocated by improved images and perceptions around the world.1 In 
general, transparency refers to the ways in which citizens are able to observe and appreciate their 
public institutions at work. This is likely to be measured through perceptions. The main indicator 
to measure transparency is basically the state of public corruption in a country. In this sense,  
annual releases of Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (hereafter, CPI), the 
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World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and others provide certain data 
which are largely criticized for a number of methodological reasons already detailed in other 
scholarly works.2 One problem is validity: it is unclear what, if anything, such indices actually 
measure. Thus, links between survey responses and actual governance problems are unproven 
(Apaza, 2009, Thomas, 2007; Arndt and Oman, 2006).  A second major problem is the “one-
number” issue: a single score for all parts of a society can tell us very little.3   
 In the case of the CPI, judgments are drawn from panels of experts (Transparency 
International: Corruption Perceptions Index 1999-2008.) For the WGI indicators, ratings are 
designed from a range of opinion-based data combined with selected “hard” indicators using an 
aggregation methodology through sophisticated statistical techniques.4 None of those indicators 
purports to measure transparency as such—an important concern since, as we shall see, nations 
are urged to practice transparency but have difficulty demonstrating the effects of their efforts. 
This is even more critical, as noted in the next section, when referring to local government 
transparency and anticorruption efforts because the international corruption indeces only assess a 
country as a whole, ignoring the situation of corruption at the local government level.    
CPI data suggest that during 1999 - 2008 corruption in the Americas and the Caribbean 
region has remained low to moderate, generally falling between 4 and 5 on the CPI scale, which 
ranges from 1 (bad) to 10 (good) (See figure 1). During the same decade, however, corruption 
has become a critical problem for a number of countries in the region. For instance, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela rank just above 2 on the ten-point scale. Haiti’s situation is even more 
critical, scoring below 2. Colombia, El Salvador, and Perú barely reach 4. By contrast, Costa 
Rica, Dominica, and Uruguay score around 5. The best ratings belong to Canada (nearly 9), 
Chile (above 7), Saint Lucia (approximately 7), and USA (above 7). 
However, even if such rankings are correct in suggesting that a country has fewer or more 
corruption problems, they give us no guidance as to where those problems reside, what ought to 
be done about them, or how we would recognize improvement if it took place. Indeed, in some 
respects country-level rankings are the opposite of real transparency: they are based upon blanket 
judgments made at a distance by individuals whose knowledge of a society’s realities is 
uncertain or confused.5 Some good examples of somewhat unreliable CPI ratings are the cases of 
Colombia and Honduras as detailed below. 
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Figure 1: 
Average Corruption  Perceptions Trend  (1999-2008) in OAS State 
Parties to the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
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              Source: Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index 1999-2008 
    http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
 
II. Government Efforts to Promote Ethics and Transparency in Colombia and Honduras  
Colombia 
Colombia has remained holding a moderate-low score on the CPI during 1999 - 2008, 
stabilizing at around 4 since 2005 (see figure 2). Crucial reforms in the public sector 
administration have been undertaken to remedy this situation.  
A number of factors shape corruption problems in Colombia, including low salaries, high 
unemployment rates, and the lack of strong state institutions. Of particular concern are links 
between politicians and the drug “kingpins.”6 For example, in 1995, within the “Proceso 8000”7 
case, it was proven that President Ernesto Samper received illegal funds to run his presidential 
campaign.  
Recently, however, Colombia has taken steps toward higher levels of integrity and 
transparency in government. For instance, during the Andres Pastrana administration (1998-
2002) major initiatives included Presidential Directive No. 9, issuing guidelines in policies 
                                                 
6 This term refers to drug trafficking heads, or Capos de la mafia. 
7  http://semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=44895: This page shows an article of the magazine “Revista 
Semana”, in which the case investigations against President Ernesto Samper and other politicians envolved with 
narcotrafic heads (“capos” del narcotráfico), are clearly detailed. 
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against corruption. Law No. 489 of 1998 regulates administration according to principles of good 
faith, equality, transparency, morality, efficiency, efficacy, economy, speed, impartiality, 
publicity, participation and responsibility, all of which must be administered by the Oversight 
Bodies and the National Department of Planning, according to Article 343 of the Political 
Constitution of Colombia. Decree 2405 of 1998 led the government’s agenda to lessen 
corruption and improve the principles of public administration.8 Law No. 526 of 1999 created 
the Financial Analysis and Information Unit.9 Law No. 598 of 2000 created the Information 
System to Oversee Contracting Out and a Catalog called the Reference Prices List, intended to 
regulate fiscal duties and guarantee the transparency in contracting and the use of the goods and 
services by the public administration. Finally, Law No. 734 of 2002 created the Discipline Code 
for public servants.10   
 
Figure 2: 
Average Corruption  Perceptions Trend  (1999-2008) in Colombia
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Source: Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index 1999-2008 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
 
The Uribe Administration (2002-2010) has continued such efforts. For instance, through 
the “Democratic Manifesto” President Uribe proposed: “1. […] to defeat corruption. 2. Corrupt 
public officials are not allowed to return to public office by appointment, election or by contract. 
3. Each contract must be monitored by the community. […]. 4. Public hearings for contract 
adjudications.  Publication and price sharing of the official purchases […]”11
                                                 
8 Decree No. 2405 was modified by Decree No. 127 of 2001. 
9 Part of the mission of this unit was the “detection, prevention, and in general the fight against money laundry in all 
the economic activities in general (Law No. 526 of 1999.) 
10 This was created according to article 124 of the Colombian Constitution of 1991. 
11http://www.minminas.gov.co/minminas/pagesweb.nsf/0/1229c9fffdb0b2d905256def00707eff?OpenDocument.
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President Uribe proposed a Referendum on a series of policies intended to carry out his 
theme called “Mano Firme, Corazón Grande” (A Firm Hand, A Big Heart). The proposals would 
reduce government spending while generating more funds for health and education; withdraw the 
civil rights of public officials who commit fraud; strengthen public institutions; defeat poverty 
and unemployment; and consolidate democracy.  The Newspaper El País12 commented: “The 
Referendum is not miraculous but it is a step that Colombia needs to take in order to defeat 
corruption, and strengthen the fight against terrorism.” Unfortunately, the Referendum was 
rejected.  
In 2002 Decree No. 2170 was issued regulating the Law No. 80, governing the 
participation of the community in monitoring pre-contractual, contractual and post-contractual 
stages of the solicitation process. That measure was later modified by Decree 2434 of 2006 
requiring the publication of terms of reference on an internet portal for contracting. 
In 2003 Law No. 850 established the Citizens Oversight Mechanism (Veedurías 
Ciudadanas). 13  Colombia’s civil society has been actively involved in efforts to control 
corruption. Some of the civil society organizations collaborating with government initiatives 
include “Corporación Transparencia por Colombia/Chapter of International Transparency”, 
promoting and constructing tools for the fight against corruption, and the “Corporación de 
Acción Ciudadana Colombia AC Colombia” that promotes and consolidates democracy by 
supporting the integral formation of public institutions. 
Interestingly enough, recent successful criminal trials against corrupt officials 
demonstrate that a hard fight against corruption is taking place. 14  For instance, the corrupt 
Superintendent of Notary and Registrar15  was indicted for soliciting funds from notaries to 
finance his political campaign. In the case of the “Electrificadora Termorío” the superintendent 
of public services was convicted for appropriation of public funds and for investment interest in 
public solicitations for his own benefit. And in the “Parapolítica” cases16 over 80 politicians have 
been inculpated in hidden links to ‘paramilitares’. However, investigations continue against 
many figures on allegations of crimes against public administration, moral ethics and rectitude. 
Government efforts also continue to seize properties acquired with illegal funds.17 Furthermore, 
                                                 
12http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/referendum/Uribe/corrupcion/desata/violencia/Colombia/elpporint/20
031025elpepuint_2/Tes. 
13 Law No. 850 de 2003, Artícle 1º.
14 http://nuevagaceta.org/comunidad/ng-5-2.htm. Last view Nov.14 2008 
15  El Espectador.com “punís Cuello Baute to eight years in prison”. Judicial Section, April 9, 2008. Available at 
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/articulo-condenan-ocho-anos-de-prision-cuello-baute. 
16 El Nuevo Siglo-LA PARA-POLITICA 2008, Monday, Jan. 14, 2008. “The List of Terrorist of Democratic 
Security.” Available online at:  http://colombia.indymedia.org/news/2008/01/77696.php   
17  Law 793 of 2002 officially published on Diario Oficial Nro. 45.046, December 27, 2002. Available at: 
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/leyes/L0793002.HTM . Regarding this issue also see Jurisprudence available 
at:http://www.usergioarboleda.edu.co/derecho_penal/jurisprudencia_ult_tri_07.htm
http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/articulo87486-desarticulada-red-dedicada-al-lavado-de-activos: 
http://www.vanguardia.com/pais/103-pais/11528-extincion-de-dominio-a-154-bienes-de-don-mario
http://www.caracol.com.co/nota.aspx?id=596165
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there are ongoing investigations related to the links between paramilitarismo violence and 
corruption.18
 
Honduras 
 For many years Honduras has ranked as one of the countries in the Americas region 
with more corruption, along with Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. During 2005 - 2008 Honduras 
ratings have kept stable at below three out of ten (see figure 3). However, Honduras has been 
experiencing improvements at the local level that are not reflected on the CPI scores.  
 
Figure 3: 
Average Corruption  Perceptions Trend  (1999-2008) in Honduras
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Source: Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index 1999-2008 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
 
 In Honduras, public corruption in the form of bribery is penalized by Article 361 of the 
Criminal Code, which states that “Any public official or employee who solicits, receives or 
accepts, either on his own or through third parties, handouts, gifts, offers, promises or any other 
undue advantage in exchange for performing any act that violates his or her duties and 
constitutes a crime shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of five (5) to seven (7) 
                                                 
18 General Attorney Report ( 2006-2007): investigations related to the corruption, terrorism and “paramilitarismo” 
crimes. Available at: http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/pag/divulga/gestioncalidad/Informe%20Fiscalía%202006-2007.pdf
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years, plus absolute disqualification from public office for double the period of his or her 
incarceration, separate and apart from the penalty incurred by reason of the crime committed in 
exchange for the handout or promise.”19  
 In 1998, Honduras ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and 
adopted measures to fight such behavior as money laundering, influence-peddling, 
embezzlement and obstruction of justice. It also became one of the first countries in the region to 
deny immunity for former public officials, including presidents, in corruption cases. 20  
Nevertheless, a small percentage of all corruption cases is actually punished. For instance, 
according to the National Anti-Corruption Council's report, only 2.2 percent of the 1,925 
corruption cases that reached the court between 2002 and 2006 ended in a conviction.21
In 2001 the Congress passed the Law of State Contracting (Decree Number 74-2001), and 
its Regulation (Executive Agreement Number 055-2002), which apply to contracts for public 
works, the provision of goods and services, and consulting services entered into by the 
Centralized and Decentralized Public Administration organs in the Executive, as well as in the 
Legislative and Judicial branches (Article 1.) Article 38 of the Law, provides that public 
procurement shall be carried out through: (1) Public Tenders, (Articles 41 to 58); (2) Private 
Tenders, (Articles 59 and 60); (3) Public Competition, (Articles 61 and 62); (4) Private 
Competition (Articles 61 and 62); and Direct Contracting (Article 63). In addition, the Law also 
provides that procurements that are in excess of the amount established in the General Provisions 
of the General Budget of State Income and Expenditures, shall be carried out via public bidding 
(Articles 38, 59 and 61 Law of State Contracting.)22
In 2005 Decree Number 010-2005 created the Honduran System of Information on State 
Contracting and Procurement, “HONDUCOMPRAS.” 23  Then, on November 23, 2006, the 
Honduran Congress passed the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law, becoming 
the sixth Latin American country to adopt such a law. The law established the National Institute 
for Access to Public Information (IAIP) as the clearinghouse for processing citizens’ information 
requests. However, the law contains a lot of gaps and a lot of provisions for keeping most of 
public information secret (i.e. “reserved information.”) According to this law, Government 
ministers are able to restrict any document that is believed to threaten economic stability or 
governance. "Virtually any document can be classified as reserved.” For instance, under the new 
law, all information about humanitarian aid is secret. The amounts of aid received and the uses to 
which they are put cannot be divulged.24  
                                                 
19  Criminal Code of Honduras. Decreto Número 144-83. Available at: http://www.upoli.edu.ni/icep/legis-
mesoamerica/C%F3digo%20Penal%20Honduras.pdf
20  Mechanisms for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption 
(MESICIC). Tenth Meeting of the Committee of Experts. December 11-16, 2006. Republic of Honduras Final 
Report. http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/mesicic_II_rep_hnd.pdf
21 Marcela Sánchez “Honduras Losing Steam on Corruption Fight.” Washington post, Friday, July 27, 2007. 
Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/26/AR2007072601615.html
22 MESICIC 2 Round, Ibidem, p 9 
23 www.honducompras.gob.hn.  
24 Thelma Mejía. “Corruption – Honduras: A Murky Transparency Law.” Interpress Service. News Agency, 22 de 
Febrero, 2007. Available at:  http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36682
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On February 10, 2007, about 30,000 Hondurans marched in Tegucigalpa to protest 
corruption and demand “real” transparency in government.25 In responding to this demand, the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) developed a crucial project on municipal 
transparency in Honduras.26 The project addressed the design and development of performance 
measurement indicators at the local level. It was executed from February to December of 2004. 
Its main objective was to support nine Transparency Commissions - civilian entities of social 
accounting - in nine municipalities in Honduras with the purpose of promoting transparent 
management of resources at a local level. It thus permitted the fortification of local government 
and therefore human development.27  
III. Possible Solutions and Conclusion 
Based on the original experience developed in Honduras (as detailed above) the author 
suggests an “active transparency” system to prevent corruption. This innovative system will 
require the following basic issues: 
• Full participation of the civil society through a number of “municipal representatives” 
elected directly by the public and the ones already elected during the municipal political 
elections. 
• Technical assistants hired by a third party –an international organization (e.g., the 
Organization of American States-OAS) or an integrity watchdog organization. 
• Active participation of the Mayor’s office. 
• Training offered to citizens and Municipal officials on active transparency issues.  
• Design of active transparency and corruption perception indicators before and after the 
implementation of the project.  
In the end, the project will produce active transparency by providing citizens with crucial 
information on how governance is evolving, allowing them informed participation in decision 
making processes. It will promote inclusive participation.  
 
Conclusion   
Corruption perceptions developed by a number of international organizations such as 
Transparency International tell an incomplete (and somehow unreliable) story of the situation of 
corruption and anticorruption mechanisms such as transparency and integrity policies in a 
country. Furthermore, they ignore important transparency practices, both passive and active, at 
the national and local government level such as in the cases of Colombia and Honduras 
described above. A practical solution to the problem involves an active transparency system 
                                                 
25 Freedom House (2007.) Report on Honduras 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=8&ccrcountry=157&section=84&ccrpage=37
26  United Nations Development Program (2005) “An Experience in Local Transparency in Honduras.” 
http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/PAR_Guides_localtransparency.pdf
27United Nations Development Program (2005). Ibidem. p12 
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especially at the local government level. This mechanism would not only help to improve the 
oversight of government activities preventing corruption but it would also promote dialogue and 
inclusive citizen participation on government integrity and transparency efforts. 
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